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In Becoming Undone, Elizabeth 
Grosz connects Charles Darwin’s 
account of biological evolution as 
an unpredictable and open-ended 
process of variation to the phi-
losophies of henri Bergson, Gilles 
Deleuze, and Luce Irigaray in 
order to elaborate a more or less 
neomaterialist ontology of sexual 
difference as the engine of natu-
ral existence, the vital mechanism 
productive of the complexity and 
excesses of life as we may or may 
not know it. The book is set over 
and against what Grosz perceives 
as a postmodern feminism in which 
notions of nature and matter have 
been sidelined, and where, more 
precisely, ontological inquiries into 
the constitution of life have been 
subsumed under epistemologi-
cal considerations of how bodies 
come to matter exclusively in terms 
of language, discourse, and cul-
ture. Grosz, in contrast, develops 
a Darwinian feminism and a post-
modern Darwinism that attempts 
to rethink the materiality of sexual 
difference through the inhuman 
time of evolutionary becoming.
Whereas feminist theorists have 
generally been reluctant to engage 
with Darwinian thought beyond 
the scope of epistemological cri-
tique, Grosz’s work takes a differ-
ent and more affirmative approach. 
The aim of Becoming Undone is 
not to address the androcentrism 
apparent in Darwin’s theory of evo-
lution, nor to assess the essentialist 
approaches to sexual and racial 
ThE LIFE AND 
DEATh OF SEXUAL 
DIFFERENCE
Louis van den hengel
Becoming Undone: Darwinian 
Reflections on Life, Politics, and 
Art by Elizabeth Grosz. Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 
2011. Pp. 264. $84.95 cloth; $23.95 
paper.
Criticism 58.1_06_BM.indd   153 17/03/17   11:17 am
154 LOUIS VAN DEN hENGEL
folded into matter as the potential 
to become different. This nonteleo-
logical reading of Darwin is directly 
opposed to the traditions of social 
Darwinism that tend to reduce all 
evolutionary mechanisms to the 
teleological principle of survival—a 
reduction that has on more than one 
occasion facilitated a classification 
of humanity as the pinnacle of cre-
ation that runs counter to Darwin’s 
own work. Indeed, Grosz posits a 
fundamental continuity between 
individuals and species of all kinds, 
not because they share a common 
genealogy, but because all of life is 
enjoined in the transformation of 
matter. Grosz’s Darwinism, then, 
is a highly Deleuzian one in which 
evolution is construed as a trans-
versal force of creative transforma-
tion, an impersonal cut across the 
boundaries between organic and 
inorganic vitality, an unpredictable 
and increasingly complex elabora-
tion of life as the power to differ.
If, as Deleuze has suggested, 
“Darwin’s great novelty was that 
of inaugurating the thought of 
individual difference,”1 Grosz 
seizes upon Darwin’s idea that it 
is sexual difference, in the form of 
sexual selection, through which 
life first elaborates itself as a con-
tinuous process of variation and 
creative excess. It is through her 
philosophical exploration of the 
relation between sexual and natu-
ral selection in Darwin’s writings, 
and her subsequent elaboration 
of a dynamic ontology of sexual 
differences within neo-Darwinian 
sociobiology or evolutionary psy-
chology, but rather to take hold of 
what in Darwin’s work is useful for 
the elaboration of feminist thought 
beyond postmodern theories of 
power and difference, and past the 
limits of egalitarian politics of rec-
ognition. Against this background, 
Grosz advances a philosophy of 
life and matter as deeply attuned 
not only to each other but to the 
generative force of duration—the 
becoming and unbecoming—
through which biological evolution 
proceeds as an open-ended process 
of differentiation, especially sexual 
differentiation.
Starting from the basic 
Darwinian insight that the differ-
ences between humans and other 
animal species, as well as among 
human beings, are differences in 
degree and not in kind, Grosz uses 
the philosophies of Bergson and 
Deleuze to theorize evolutionary 
emergence not merely as a rela-
tion between different forms of 
life but as a dynamic entanglement 
between life and the inorganic 
forces of matter. Life and matter 
are conceptualized not as binary 
opposites but as divergent tenden-
cies or trajectories, two different 
degrees of the same, ever-differing, 
force of duration: the temporal or 
evolutionary impulse that enables 
life to actualize the “vital indeter-
minacy” (34) of the material world 
from which it emerges, to unfold 
the dynamic unpredictability that is 
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increasingly mundane fashion, 
feminist scholarship from the 1990s 
onwards. Grosz, however, hardly 
engages with any of the new mate-
rial feminisms that have emerged 
as a response to this call, which is 
one of the reasons why, although 
I am fully committed to what she 
has called the “forgotten question of 
ontology,”3 I remain unconvinced 
by the rhetorical gestures that 
underpin the urgency with which 
that question is posed. There are 
few specific references to feminist 
scholarship in Becoming Undone, 
and Grosz’s repeated criticisms 
of “feminist egalitarianism” and 
“postmodern feminism” are not 
substantiated by in-depth readings 
of whatever theorists are supposed 
to be filed under these extremely 
elastic concepts. The book as a 
whole lacks much of the meticulous 
engagement with feminist theory 
that characterized Grosz’s earliest 
work. The assertion that “concepts 
of autonomy, agency, and freedom 
. . . are continuously evoked in fem-
inist theory” but “have been rarely 
defined, explained, or analyzed” 
(59), for example, is overly gener-
alized at best, while observations 
about feminism’s “submersion in 
the politics of representation” (85) 
and “the overwhelming dominance 
of identity politics” (89) sound curi-
ously quaint in light of Grosz’s own 
insistence, in the same chapter, 
that what is principally at stake in 
 feminist theory is the invention of 
the new.
divergence, that Grosz’s Darwin 
emerges not only as a decisive 
theorist of becoming, but—unwit-
tingly—as “the first feminist of 
difference” (142). As unexpected a 
designation this may be for some-
one whose vision of evolution regu-
larly attests to the biological and 
social inferiority of women, and 
whose personal views about sexual 
difference may be summed up by 
a calculated list of marriage’s pros 
and cons describing female com-
panionship as slightly preferable to 
owning a dog,2 Grosz convincingly 
shows how Darwin’s open-ended 
understanding of nature and mat-
ter as constitutive of vital transfor-
mations may become central to the 
elaboration of a nonanthropocen-
tric feminism of difference, a “new 
kind of feminism” (57) that reworks 
the problem of sexual difference in 
the bio-ontological context of “ani-
mal becomings and the becomings 
microscopic and imperceptible that 
regulate matter itself” (86).
Like in her previous work, 
Grosz frames the invocation of the 
concepts of nature, matter, and life 
as a turn—or return—to a “more 
archaic” but also “more modern-
ist” tradition that has been largely 
neglected in feminist theory (59). 
The call to reclaim matter—not 
the materiality of the body, but the 
biological dynamism from which 
all bodies emerge—from its per-
ceived absence in feminist theory 
after the cultural turn is of course 
not new, but has pervaded, in an 
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work by reading it as a Deleuzian 
feminist analysis of difference 
avant la lettre. More importantly, 
the notion of sexual selection in 
her view explains the persistence 
of sexual difference as an ontologi-
cal force in the evolution of life. It 
is at this point, argues Grosz, that 
“feminists who are committed to 
the concept of the irreducible dif-
ference between the sexes,” such 
as Irigaray, “may find in Darwin’s 
writings surprising confirmation 
of their claims” (156). This is a 
compelling statement, and yet the 
interweaving of Irigaray’s ontol-
ogy of sexual difference with a 
Deleuzian–Darwinian under-
standing of evolution is not with-
out problems. The most important 
difficulties, in my view, arise from 
Grosz’s tendency to contain the 
vital indeterminacy of matter—its 
infinite potential for change and 
transformation—within a binary of 
sexual difference that is understood 
as ontologically impossible to over-
come. Since, as Grosz has claimed 
elsewhere, “sexual selection differ-
entiates all species touched by its 
trace with an irreducible binarism 
that itself generates endless variety 
on either side of its bifurcation,”5 
life on earth in her view consists in 
the elaboration of multiple lines of 
development that cannot proceed 
without the irreducible existence 
of at least two types of being. Yet if 
physical forms of evolution occur 
through the nonteleological force 
of duration, and if sexual selection 
If Becoming Undone provides 
a foundation for future femi-
nist thought, it is not through its 
account of recent feminist history, 
but by means of Grosz’s interpreta-
tion of evolutionary theory as a way 
to rethink the materiality of sexual 
difference as an entanglement of—
rather than interaction between—
the biological, the cultural, and the 
social.4 To this end, Grosz revisits 
Irigaray’s conception of sexual dif-
ference—as an irreducible ontolog-
ical  difference—through Darwin’s 
account of sexual selection. Darwin 
introduced the concept of sexual 
selection in part to explain the ori-
gins of phenomena that cannot 
be attributed to natural selection, 
such as the differences in appear-
ance between male and female ani-
mals, the operations of erotic appeal 
and attraction, and the presence of 
beauty in the natural world. Sexual 
selection hence accounts for the evo-
lution of features without any par-
ticular survival value, such as large 
antlers or ornate peacock feathers, 
which are primarily directed to the 
attainment of sexual partners. Since 
sexual selection is independent from 
the logic of reproduction—even if it 
may lead to reproductive success—
Grosz views it as a strategy to maxi-
mize difference or variation itself, 
to proliferate differences for the 
sake of beauty and pleasure alone, 
for the intensification of nothing 
but pure difference.
Grosz thus acknowledges a 
rich feminist potential in Darwin’s 
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determined and yet do not exactly 
constitute the biology of sexual dif-
ference.”8 In this way, Grosz’s neo-
materialist philosophy of life in its 
virtual multiplicity, its openness 
to “the irresistible future of sexual 
difference” (101), paradoxically 
ends up denying the unpredictable 
nature of sexual evolution.
That Grosz, in light of the end-
less variation generated through 
sexual difference as an evolutionary 
force, continues to cast this differ-
ence in terms of ontological duality 
rather than irreducible multiplic-
ity cannot be divorced from her 
concentration on the later work 
of Irigaray. As many critics have 
noted, Irigaray’s oeuvre is split 
into an earlier phase and a later 
phase: whereas the former devel-
ops a fluid philosophy of difference 
as not-One, the latter asserts the 
duality of sexual difference at the 
increasing expense of sexual and 
natural multiplicity.9 More impor-
tantly, this later work affirms what 
Rosi Braidotti has called “the meta-
physics of two” from a distinctly 
heterosexual, or at least hetero-
social, perspective.10 In I Love to 
You (1996), for example, Irigaray 
unambiguously positions the male–
female relationship as the paradig-
matic model for the “mysterious” 
force of sexual difference, and even 
turns the heterosexual couple into 
the privileged site for the devel-
opment of ethical social relations, 
feminist politics, and the creativ-
ity of life itself.11 Although Grosz, 
is governed not by sexual reproduc-
tion but by the unpredictable forces 
of aesthetic choice and appeal, why 
does Grosz need to posit an irre-
ducible ontological binarism as the 
sine qua non of biological and cul-
tural differentiation?
In fact, Grosz’s own neomate-
rialist Darwinism—if taken to its 
logical conclusion—would seem 
to imply a rather opposite under-
standing of sexual difference as a 
process of ontological differentia-
tion irreducible to any sexual bina-
rism. Grosz a priori rejects this 
view,6 which leads to a curiously 
unresolved tension between her 
open-ended reading of evolution-
ary unfolding on the one hand and 
her affirmation of the ontomateri-
ality of binary sexual difference on 
the other. The crucial point here, as 
Luciana Parisi has astutely noted, is 
that if the evolution of sex is truly 
considered as a form of process—
that is, if it is conceptualized from 
a radical empiricist perspective—
then “the biological formation of 
two sexes may coincide not with 
the ontological duration of sexual 
difference but . . . with an accident, 
an event in evolution.”7 By ground-
ing the becoming and unbecoming 
of life in a model of two irreduc-
ible sexes, Grosz fails to attend not 
to the potentially infinite expres-
sions of sexual difference per se, 
but to the myriad forms of sex that 
run beneath the figure of the two, 
the “infinitesimal number of dif-
ferential sexes that are completely 
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cannot be adequately addressed 
through the notion of sexual differ-
ence as “(at least) two” (104). And 
while it may be the case that Grosz 
uses this remarkably parenthetical 
phrase, which recurs throughout 
her work, to release some of the 
tensions inherent in the encoun-
ter between Darwin and Irigaray, 
Becoming Undone makes painfully 
clear that “(at least) two” does not a 
multiplicity make.
The limits of Grosz’s account 
of sexual difference become read-
ily apparent in her discussion of 
the objections against Irigaray by 
Drucilla Cornell and Judith Butler. 
The latter in particular points to 
the “presumptive heterosexual-
ity” in Irigaray’s conception of 
ethical exchange, which not only 
privileges the sexual over all other 
forms of difference but also, as 
already noted, frames the genera-
tive interval of sexual difference 
through a most narrow version of 
heterosexual relationality.14 Grosz 
does not provide a direct answer 
to Butler’s concern that Irigaray 
denies the existence of ethically 
enabling differences within same-
sex relationships, but points out 
that all sexual relations—no matter 
how queer—are affected by sexual 
difference. While this in principle 
acknowledges same-sex relations as 
a locus for the affirmation of sexual 
alterity—a much-needed supple-
ment to Irigaray—it also leads to a 
curious confession on Grosz’s part: 
“I cannot see,” she writes, “how an 
with Irigaray, acknowledges that 
sexual difference cannot be con-
tained within the sexual identities 
of male and female as they are pres-
ently lived or actualized, she seems 
to take no issue with the latter’s 
conviction that the affirmation of 
sexual difference, if it is to be truly 
ethical, “will come from the evolu-
tion, the revolution in the relations 
between man and woman, first and 
foremost in the couple.”12 Becoming 
Undone instead takes the bifurca-
tion between male and female, 
effected through sexual selection, 
as the primary mechanism through 
which the evolution of life proceeds 
in “two different incalculable direc-
tions” (141).
I do not want to imply at this 
point that Grosz’s conception of the 
natural as “never one but always 
at least two” (149)  reproduces 
 normative heterosexuality at the 
ontomaterial level of life itself. The 
problem rather lies in the residual 
organicism of Grosz’s concep-
tion of evolution. It is precisely 
to the extent that Grosz locates 
the force of sexual difference in 
the complexification of organic 
life that her attachment to a late- 
Irigarayan ontology of sexual dif-
ference—perceived as a duality 
that “inscribes finitude in the natu-
ral itself”13—closes down what her 
Deleuzian reading of Darwin had 
so creatively opened up: the infinite 
potentiality of matter to unfold a 
qualitative multiplicity of sexes, 
a proliferation of sex events that 
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dangerously close to the transpho-
bic assumption that trans individ-
uals may look like “real” men or 
women, but can never actually be 
the sex with which they identify. 
Equally problematic are Grosz’s 
claims about nontraditional fam-
ily arrangements, which under the 
pervasive impact of sexual differ-
ence in her view inevitably take 
a heterosexual form: “The roles 
of mommy and daddy are perpe-
trated even within gay families,” 
according to Grosz, “although it 
is no longer clear that the mommy 
is a woman and the daddy is a 
man” (108). While this argument 
willfully ignores the possibility 
that queer forms of kinship may 
transform rather than reproduce 
the nuclear family model, it also 
remains curiously anthropocentric 
in light of Grosz’s own Darwinian 
interpretation of sexual difference. 
Even when we leave aside that 
two-parent families are largely 
absent in nonhuman nature, where 
single parenting or the absence 
of any parental investment is the 
norm,15 it remains entirely unclear 
how the reproduction of gender 
roles rooted in human sociality 
would testify to the ontological 
persistence of sexual difference as 
a nonhuman force.
That Grosz refers to Darwinian 
sexual selection as “the queering 
of natural selection” (132) diffuses 
rather than solves the problem. 
While Grosz interestingly places 
a queer intensification of bodies 
understanding of sexuality, sexual 
pleasure, desire, and identity can be 
developed which doesn’t discern, as 
part of its very operations, the rela-
tive values of and attraction to the 
particularities of male and female 
bodies, organs, and activities” (108). 
Unfortunately, this failure to envi-
sion sexual difference beyond a 
binary frame subsequently trans-
lates into a number of contentious 
claims about how sexual difference, 
as a constitutive difference, suppos-
edly operates in relation to sex, gen-
der, and sexuality.
The full weight of the paren-
thetical “(at least) two” comes to 
bear on Grosz’s interpretation of 
intersexuality and transsexuality. 
While the former is simply dis-
missed as confirming rather than 
challenging the binary nature of 
sexual difference, Grosz considers 
the latter as—quoting Irigaray—
the “new opium for the people” 
(110). Indeed, she insists that 
“however queer, transgendered 
[sic], and ethnically identified one 
might be, one comes from a man 
and a woman, and one remains 
a man or a woman, even in the 
case of gender-reassignment or 
the chemical and surgical trans-
formations of one sex into the 
appearance of another” (109–10). 
This remarkably strong statement 
not only suggests that sexual dif-
ference is controlled by bodily 
difference—a view inconsistent 
with the work of either Irigaray 
or Grosz herself—but also comes 
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such reductive textual oppositions, 
for hemmings, is their amenability 
to the highly problematic framing 
of the sexual in broader postfemi-
nist and antifeminist discourses 
far beyond their own theoretical 
location.
To be clear, I do not want to 
suggest that Grosz’s evolution-
ary narrative serves to set queer 
theory against neomaterialist 
feminism—after all, whether 
her work has this or precisely the 
opposite effect surely depends 
on the reader. Nevertheless, the 
aforementioned examples are 
revealing of the tensions not 
only between the Deleuzian–
Darwinian and Irigarayan strands 
in Grosz’s work, but more gener-
ally between feminist new mate-
rialism and queer criticism within 
contemporary philosophies of 
life. By reading Grosz’s compel-
ling turn towards the evolution 
of life and matter in light of the 
genealogy of feminist theory and 
its discontents, I have attempted 
to show how the commitment to 
an irreducible binarism of sexual 
difference, in tandem with an 
affirmation of difference as the 
generative force of the living and 
nonliving universe, both invokes 
and disavows the existence of a 
natural multiplicity—a biologi-
cal queerness, perhaps—that is 
just as sexually specific and just 
as real, both phenomenologically 
and ontologically, as the nature of 
sexual duality.
at the heart of her  neomaterialist 
reading of sexual evolution, the 
strong association of this  queerness 
with the “skills of spectacular per-
formance” (125)—the “noisy color-
fulness” and “artistic excessiveness” 
(126) of the most attractive mem-
bers of a particular species—is not 
theoretically innocent. In effect, 
the naming of sexual selection as 
queer potentially reinforces the 
stereotypical association of queer-
ness—and queer theory—with the 
conceptually frivolous and politi-
cally unproductive spaces of gender 
performativity, erotic pleasure, and 
aesthetic display. The establish-
ment of such links between queer 
theory and frivolity is actually 
central to what Clare hemmings 
has perceptively called the “politi-
cal grammar” of much contem-
porary feminist theory, especially 
those narratives that, like Grosz’s, 
reclaim a “forgotten” material-
ity or ontology in order to move 
beyond the textual abstractions of 
the cultural turn.16 Since such nar-
ratives are generally marked by an 
overassociation of cultural theory 
with sexual critique, as hemmings 
demonstrates in admirable detail, 
they problematically position 
queer theory—often in the person 
of Butler—as “the quintessential 
opposite” of feminist new materi-
alism, an “anachronistic interrup-
tion” that needs to be overcome in 
order to regain feminist commit-
ment and political credibility.17 One 
of the most pernicious effects of 
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